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Ronan Point Apartment Tower Collapse and its Effect
on Building Codes
Cynthia Pearson1 and Norbert Delatte, M.ASCE2
Abstract: In the early morning hours of May 16, 1968, the occupant of apartment 90 on the 18th ﬂoor of the 22-story Ronan Point
apartment tower, in London, lit a match to brew her morning cup of tea. The resulting gas explosion initiated a partial collapse of the
structure that killed four people and injured 17 (one of whom subsequently died). On investigation, the apartment tower was found to be
deeply ﬂawed in both design and construction. The existing building codes were found to be inadequate for ensuring the safety and
integrity of high-rise precast concrete apartment buildings. The Larsen–Nielson building system, intended for buildings with only six
stories, had been extended past the point of safety. The tower consisted of precast panels joined together without a structural frame. The
connections relied, in large part, on friction. The apartment tower lacked alternate load paths to redistribute forces in the event of a partial
collapse. When the structure was dismantled, investigators found appallingly poor workmanship at the critical connections between the
panels. Subsequently, building codes in many countries have adopted structural integrity or “robustness” provisions that may be directly
traced to the Ronan Point collapse.

CE Database subject headings: Structural failures; Building codes; Forensic engineering; Collapse; Case reports.

Introduction
In the early morning hours of May 16, 1968, the occupant of
apartment 90 on the 18th ﬂoor of the 22-story Ronan Point apart
ment tower lit a match for her stove to brew her morning cup of
tea. The resulting gas explosion, due to a leak, knocked her un
conscious.
The pressure of the small gas explosion blew out the walls of
her apartment, and initiated a partial collapse of the structure that
killed four people and injured 17. One of the injured, an 82-year
old woman, subsequently died, but possibly not due to the col
lapse (Grifﬁths et al. 1968). The partially collapsed structure is
shown in Fig. 1. The ﬂoor plan for apartment 90 is provided in
Fig. 2.
The collapse was investigated and a report was quickly issued
(Grifﬁths et al. 1968). The collapse was attributed to the gas ex
plosion displacing walls and initiating a progressive collapse up
ward and then downward through the corner of the building. The
building was repaired and reinforced. Years later, when the build
ing was systematically dismantled, poor workmanship was found

throughout. The Ronan Point collapse illustrated a lack of provi
sions for general structural integrity (or, as termed in the United
Kingdom, “robustness”) in existing building codes and led to
changes in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

Design and Construction
In the decades following the Second World War, many high-rise
apartment tower blocks were constructed in London to replace the
housing stock destroyed during the conﬂict. A change in policy
allowed the density of occupancy to increase substantially. Skilled
construction laborers were also becoming scarce. This shortage
worsened as construction workers began to take safer and easier
jobs in factories (Bignell 1977).
These factors and the development of prefabricated construc
tion techniques (known as system building) led to the popularity
of high-rise apartment buildings. This new style of housing was
intended to accommodate large numbers of people, save land and
labor, and be constructed quickly.
The Ronan Point Apartment Tower was constructed using the
Larsen–Neilsen system. This system was developed in Denmark
in 1948. The Larsen–Nielson system was “composed of factorybuilt, precast concrete components designed to minimize on-site
construction work. Walls, ﬂoors and stairways are all precast. All
units, installed one-story high, are load bearing” (ENR 1968).
This building system encompassed the patterns for the panels and
joints, the method of panel assembly, and the methods of produc
tion of the panels.
Ronan Point was one of many identical high-rise precast con
crete ﬂat-plate structures constructed during this time. In this type
of structural system, each ﬂoor was supported by the load-bearing
walls directly beneath it. Gravity load transfer occurred only
through these load-bearing walls. The wall and ﬂoor panels ﬁtted
together in slots. These joints were then bolted together and ﬁlled

sudden-impact loading on ﬂoor 18 caused it to give way, smash
ing ﬂoor 17 and progressing until it reached the ground.

Government Investigation

Fig. 1. Ronan Point after collapse

with dry-pack mortar to secure the connection. The connections
are shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
Ronan Point was 22-stories tall. There were a total of 110
apartment units in the building, grouped ﬁve to a ﬂoor. The build
ing had 44 two-bedroom apartments and 66 one-bedroom apart
ments. Construction began on Ronan Point on July 25, 1966, and
the tower was completed on March 11, 1968 (Cook 2003). The
building was near full occupancy.

Pressured by the public, the government quickly formed a panel
to investigate the collapse. The panel’s report was issued later that
year (Grifﬁths et al. 1968). It was quickly determined that the
explosion from the gas leak had initiated the collapse of the build
ing. A substandard brass nut had been used to connect the hose to
the stove. The nut had a thinner ﬂange than the standard, and also
had an unusual degree of chamfer. A replicate of this nut was
made and tested to determine how much force was required to
break it.
It was found that a force of 15.6 kN (3,500 lbs) would break
the connection. It was also concluded that the hose connecting the
stove to the gas line would have failed before the nut, at a force of
1.6 kN (360 lbs). The nut was assumed to have been previously
fractured by overtightening during installation, causing it to break
and allowing gas to leak into the apartment (Grifﬁths et al. 1968).
The gas may have accumulated at the ceiling, explaining why
the resident did not notice it. The explosion was not signiﬁcant in
magnitude. The resident’s hearing had not been damaged. This
suggested that the pressure was less than 70 kPa (10 psi) (Bignell
1977). Items were taken from the kitchen of this apartment and
tested. Results indicated that these objects had been exposed to
pressures of less than 70 kPa (10 psi).
The Building Research Station and Imperial College of Lon
don performed an extensive battery of tests to discover how much
internal force Ronan Point could withstand. The results indicated
that the walls could be displaced by a pressure of only 19.3 kPa
(2.8 psi) (Levy and Salvadori 1992). It was estimated that the
kitchen and living room walls were moved by a pressure of only
1.7 kPa (0.25 psi), while the exterior wall was displaced with a
pressure of 21 kPa (3 psi) (Grifﬁths et al. 1968).

Collapse
The southeast corner of the Ronan Point Tower collapsed on May
16, 1968, at approximately 5:45 a.m. The fatality rate could have
been considerably higher than four people given the extent of the
structural damage (Feld and Carper 1997). Fortunately, at the time
of the disaster, all of the residents but one were sleeping in their
bedrooms. The collapse sheared off the living room portion of the
apartments, leaving the bedrooms intact with the exception of
ﬂoors 17–22, where all the fatalities occurred. This corner of the
building contained the only three vacant apartments left in the
building. The apartment on ﬂoor 22 was the only one occupied
above ﬂoor 18.
The collapse was initiated by a gas-stove leak on the 18th ﬂoor
in apartment 90. The resident struck a match and was knocked
unconscious by the resulting explosion. The force of the explo
sion knocked out the opposite corner walls of the apartment.
These walls were the sole support for the walls directly above.
This created a chain reaction in which ﬂoor 19 collapsed, then
ﬂoor 20, and so on, propagating upward. The four ﬂoors fell onto
level 18, which initiated a second phase of the collapse. This

Fig. 2. Floor plan of apartment (based on Bignell [1977] and Levy
and Salvadori [1992])

inquiry stated, “it is estimated that ﬁre could so expand and ‘arch’
the ﬂoor slab and bend the wall panel, as to displace or rotate an
H-2 joint to a dangerous degree” (Wearne 2000).

Sam Webb, Whistleblower

Fig. 3. Interior joint (based on Wearne [2000], Bignell [1997], and
Levy and Salvadori [1992])

Ultimately, the collapse of Ronan Point was due to its lack of
structural redundancy. Its design did not incorporate fail-safe
mechanisms, and provided no alternative load paths for the upper
ﬂoors should a lower level give way.

Remedial Actions
The southeast corner of Ronan Point was rebuilt as a separate
section of apartments and then joined to the existing building by
means of walkways. Ronan Point was reinforced with blast angles
as part of the reconstruction. The blast angles added are shown in
Fig. 4, on the right side. Gas was also banned from Ronan Point.

Technical Aspects
Several factors became apparent after the public inquiry into the
collapse. The investigation revealed that strong winds and/or the
effects of a ﬁre in the building could also have caused a progres
sive collapse. Ronan Point was designed to withstand wind ve
locities of only 100 kph (63 mi/ h), but later research indicated
that for buildings of that height higher wind velocities could be
expected.
The building code used for the design of Ronan Point and its
sister buildings was issued in 1952. This set of codes had not been
kept up to date. Higher winds than those listed in the building
code were known to occur based on a publication in 1963 by the
National Physical Laboratory (Grifﬁths et al. 1968). It was noted
that “the structure had been designed to comply with ﬁfteen-year
old wind load codes that did not take into account current build
ing heights” (ENR 1970). According to the inquiry, “the suction
effect of the pressures applied by such winds, in particular the
opening of the joints as the tower block bent in the wind, would
have similar effect to the explosion.”
Fire might have also led to a collapse of Ronan Point. The

An architect named Sam Webb developed an interest in Ronan
Point. He predicted that after approximately 15 years of service,
Ronan Point would develop serious structural problems, espe
cially with the joints. In a conversation with some tenants of
Ronan Point he predicted, “there would be gaps between walls
and ﬂoors through which smoke would pass … you’d be able to
hear people and their televisions on different ﬂoors” (Wearne
2000).
Some of the residents invited him into their apartments to
perform tests. According to Webb: “One of the simplest tests was
to get a sheet of paper, tear a strip off, put it against the skirting
board, and let it go at one end. The loose end was coming out at
ceiling level in the apartment below. Another basic test was to put
a coin up against the wall and let it go. It fell through the gap as
if going into a slot machine” (Wearne 2000).
The chair of Newham’s housing committee asked Webb to
conduct a survey to assess the condition of the building. Webb
and a team of architectural students surveyed nearly half of
Ronan Point’s 110 apartments. Their ﬁndings revealed cracks in
the central stairwell and elevator shaft, which indicated move
ment throughout the building. After analyzing the cracks, Webb
realized that his predictions about Ronan Point had been con
ﬁrmed. He concluded, “In high winds it was beginning to break
up.” The building “was moving on its lifting bolts and was held
up by the ‘blast angles’ ﬁtted after the public inquiry. The drypack
mortar had been crushed—or was never there in the ﬁrst place”
(Wearne 2000). A ﬁre test was conducted 16 years after the col
lapse of the southeast corner, which veriﬁed the building’s vul
nerability to ﬁre.

Demolition of Ronan Point
Continuing concerns over the building’s structural integrity even
tually led to its demolition in May of 1986. This type of building
had a life expectancy of 60 years, but Ronan Point was razed after
just 18 years of service. The building was not demolished in the
traditional fashion. Instead, Ronan Point was dismantled ﬂoor-by
ﬂoor so that the joints could be studied. The site was an “open
site” for anyone interested.
A shocked Webb commented: “I knew we were going to ﬁnd
bad workmanship—what surprised me was the sheer scale of it.
Not a single joint was correct. Fixing straps were unattached;
leveling nuts were not wound down, causing a signiﬁcant loading
to be transmitted via the bolts; panels were placed on bolts instead
of mortar. But the biggest shock of all was the crucial H-2 loadbearing joints between ﬂoor and wall panels. Some of the joints
had less than ﬁfty percent of the mortar speciﬁed” (Wearne 2000).
Wearne (2000) provides a complete account of Webb’s work in
vestigating Ronan Point.
The ﬁndings of the poor workmanship in the construction of
Ronan Point led to the demolition of the remaining Larsen–
Nielson system-built towers. At the time these buildings were
erected, the building codes did not adequately address them.
Large concrete-panel construction was the height of innovation at
this time, and little was known about how it would perform. The

Fig. 4. Exterior joints (based on Wearne [2000], Bignell [1997], and Levy and Salvadori [1992])

building regulations in effect at the time contained a “catch-all”
clause known as the “functional requirement on structure.” This
clause contained no mention of redundancy or progressive col
lapse (Bignell 1977).

Changes to Building Codes
It was concluded by the inquiry that the codes governing con
struction and design methods needed immediate reevaluation. The
authors of the inquiry stated in their report: “[W]e do not consider
that in its present form Ronan Point is an acceptable building, and
yet it was designed to comply with the statutory standards con
tained in the Newham by-laws, which are, in all material respects,
identical with current Building Regulations. This is so manifestly
an unsatisfactory state of affairs that it is necessary to enquire
how it came about and to consider remedies for the future” (Grif
ﬁths et al. 1968).
The collapse of the southeast corner of Ronan Point initiated
changes to building codes. Building codes now take into account
the possibilities of progressive collapse and of forces from an
internal explosion. The codes also require minimum amounts of
ductility and redundancy.
One of the outcomes of this inquiry was the development of
the “ﬁfth amendment” to the U.K. building regulations in 1970.
According to Hendry, “[it] applies to all buildings over four sto
ries and requires that under speciﬁed loading conditions a struc
ture must remain stable with a reduced safety factor in the event
of a deﬁned structural member or portion thereof being removed.
Limits of damage are laid down and if these would be exceeded
by the removal of a particular member, that member must be
designed to resist a pressure of 34 kN/ m2 (51 lb/ in2) from any
direction. Of special importance in relation to load bearing wall
structures is that these conditions should be met in the event of a
wall or section of a wall being removed, subject to a maximum
length of 2.25 times the story height” (Hendry 1979).
The British conducted research on progressive collapse. The

British government mandated guidelines for the prevention of
progressive collapses. These instructions included the require
ment of a fail-safe mechanism in all large panel-system buildings,
steel bracing with ﬂoor-to-wall connectors, and a minimum ten
sile strength of 21 MPa (3,000 psi) across the length and width of
the roofs and ﬂoors (ENR 1970).
The lessons from Ronan Point changed building regulations
throughout the world. The United States followed and also imple
mented new design criteria (Fuller 1975). The Portland Cement
Association and the Prestressed Concrete Institute also issued
guidelines, including “tying building elements together and in
creasing ductility so that the building elements can better sustain
deformations from the failure of a portion of the building’s struc
ture. Transverse ties create cantilever action from adjacent walls.
Vertical ties provide suspension from panels above, peripheral ties
hold ﬂoors together, and longitudinal ties string ﬂoor planks—
large prestressed panels—together” (Ross 1984).
The engineering profession was reminded of the need for re
dundancy in design to prevent a progressive collapse. It is of
utmost importance that building designs contain some measure of
continuity (Shepherd and Frost 1995).
Over 25 years after the collapse, Longinow and Ellingwood
(1998) detailed the impact of the Ronan Point incident on build
ing codes. Changes made to U.S. model codes, particularly the
“Basic Building Code” (BOCA 1996), as well as to the National
Building Code of Canada (CCBFC 1995), provided for structural
integrity. The ASCE standard SEI/ASCE 7-02 “Minimum design
loads for buildings and other structures” (formerly American Na
tional Standards Institute ANSI A58) contains section 1.4 provid
ing for general structural integrity. It requires that structures
“shall be designed to sustain local damage with the structural
system as a whole remaining stable” (ASCE 2002). Kaminetzky
(1991) notes that the New York City and Connecticut building
codes also incorporated structural integrity provisions based on
the Ronan Point incident.
For reinforced concrete structures, the American Concrete In
stitute (ACI) code provides for structural integrity in chapters 7

(Details of Reinforcement), 13 (Two-Way Slab Systems), 16 (Pre
cast Concrete), and 18 (Prestressed Concrete) (ACI 2002). These
provisions require the designer to tie the structure together and
provide capacity in the case of moment reversal (Cagley 2003).
The concept of quality control in the construction process was
reinforced after the dismantling of Ronan Point. Although the
design ﬂaw was the main downfall of Ronan Point, poor construc
tion quality exacerbated problems with the building’s structural
integrity.
Quality control must be enforced in the construction process to
ensure public safety. According to Feld and Carper (1997), “As
with all other construction materials, the best designs in precast
and prestressed concrete can be ineffective unless the work done
in the ﬁeld is of high quality. If the design is marginal, construc
tion deﬁciencies can compound the errors increasing the potential
for serious problems. . . . Skilled supervisors who understand the
design intent and can communicate it clearly to the ﬁeld workers
are needed full-time at the construction site while all prestressed
concrete work is erected” (Feld and Carper 1997).

Ethical Aspects
Substandard workmanship had been detected in the initial inquiry
of the collapse. However, this information was hidden from the
public. Was it a question of ethics or politics? By the time the
inquiry’s ﬁndings were published in 1968, many large panelconcrete buildings had been completed. The government did not
want to consider demolishing these buildings. At least six Larsen–
Nielson system buildings had been completed by this time. There
was not enough money to strengthen them. Did the government
endanger the lives of the residents of these facilities by taking
only minimal action to strengthen the buildings?

Educational Aspects
There are many lessons to be learned from this case. This is an
excellent example of what could happen when alternative load
paths are not provided. Structural integrity against progressive
collapse, or “robustness,” should be taught in engineering
schools. Longinow and Ellingwood (1998) note that in the decade
after the Ronan Point incident, over 300 engineering articles and
reports were published on the topic and European countries and
Canada had adopted standards, but that research had stalled and
more work was needed.

Summary and Conclusions
The investigations found that the Ronan Point apartment tower
was deeply ﬂawed in both design and construction. The existing
building codes were inadequate for ensuring the safety and integ
rity of high-rise precast concrete apartment buildings. In particu
lar, the design wind pressures were too low and did not account
for the height of the building. The Larsen–Nielson building sys
tem, intended for buildings with only six stories, had been ex
tended past the point of safety.
The tower consisted of precast panels joined together without
a structural frame. The apartment tower lacked alternate load
paths to redistribute forces in the event of a partial collapse. When

the structure was dismantled, investigators found appallingly poor
workmanship of the critical connections between the panels. The
structure had been further weakened by the inadequate construc
tion practices. The result was described by Levy and Salvadori
(1992) as a “house of cards.”
The relatively low overpressure from the gas explosion should
have led to localized damage at most, not a partial progressive
collapse and the loss of four lives. The evaluation also found that
the building was unusually vulnerable to ordinary wind and ﬁre
loading.
Technology should never be counted on to substitute for prop
erly supervised skilled labor. There is a risk to the public when
pre-engineered structural systems are used without adequate con
sideration of the requirements of the project at hand, particularly
when the use of the system is expanded well beyond the original
intention. Fortunately, many building codes have developed pro
visions to guard against similar failures.
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